Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 17

Issue 2

Article 9

1950

Judicial and Regulatory Decisions

Recommended Citation
Judicial and Regulatory Decisions, 17 J. AIR L. & COM. 235 (1950)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol17/iss2/9

This Current Legislation and Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU
Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and Commerce by an authorized administrator of
SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

JUDICIAL AND REGULATORY DECISIONS
Department Editor- Richard G. Kahn*

S

THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD'S AUTHORITY TO
GRANT EXPERIMENTAL CERTIFICATES

INCE the end of the war, the Civil Aeronautics Board has granted a considerable number of temporary certificates of convenience and necessity
on an experimental basis. These have been awarded under the authority of
Section 400(d) (2) of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938.1
The authority of the Board to grant these experimental certificates has
been challenged many times in proceedings before the Board and twice
before courts, but so far to no avail. The Board's policy regarding such
experiments was established early in a mail rate case with language which
said that it would be far from the Board's intention to disapprove or discourage a reasonable amount of experimentation. 2 Therefore it is not
surprising to find this policy in force at a later date, manifested by the
granting of temporary certificates as the appropriate occasions arise.
The first challenge to the Board's authority to experiment came in 1943
when Essair sought a temporary certificate in Texas. 3 In its decision the
Board admitted that the rendering of this local air transportation service
presented a difficult economic problem and decided that the study that was
being devoted to it needed to be supplemented by the accumulation of actual
experience. In this way they justified the establishment of the service on
an experimental basis. If the result obtained warranted it, they would then
grant the carrier a permanent certificate.
The grant of this temporary certificate was challenged by Braniff Airways but the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia approved the
Board's action.4 In that decision the Court said:
"(5) We find no merit in petitioner's contentions that Essair did not
properly apply for a temporary certificate and that the Board 5has no
power to issue temporary certificates for experimental purposes."
At the present time this is the only judicial ruling directly on the point.
At least three arguments can be made from this short statement. The first
being, that the court didn't consider the point very thouroughly. Accepting
this view would be doing an injustice to the court by impliedly accusing it
of ruling on a point without proper consideration. This is an assumption
that should not be made in the absence of proof. The second assumption,
namely, that the petitioner's contentions were ill founded and inadequate,
* Student Editor, Legal Publications Board, Northwestern University School
of Law.
1 "In the case of an application for a certificate to engage in temporary air
transportation, the Authority may issue a certificate authorizing the whole or any
part thereof for such limited periods as may be required by the public convenience
and necessity, if it finds that the applicant is fit, willing and able properly to
perform such transportation and to conform to the provisions of this Act and
the rules, regulations and requirements of the Authority hereunder." Section
401(d) (2), Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 987, 49 U.S.C. 481.
2 Northwest Airlines, Inc.-Mail Rate Case, 1 CAB 275, 283 (1939).
3 Continental Airlines, Inc. Et., Texas Air Service, 4 CAB 478 (1943).
4 Braniff Airveays v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 147 F. 2d 152, (App. D.C. 1945).
5 Id. at 153.
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has more merit in view of the wording of the decision. However, a long
answer to the petitioner's brief by the Board indicates that the question
was thoroughly covered by both parties and that the court had adequate
information and discussion before it upon which to base its decision. 6 This
brings us to the third point, i.e., that the court did give thorough consideration to the question and reached the decision that the Board's position was
so obviously correct that it warranted merely an affirmance on the part of
the court. If this conclusion is correct it follows that the court seems to
have accepted the validity of the Board's arguments on this issue more or
less in their entirety for no point of disagreement with them was indicated
as there was in one of the other rulings in the decision. 7 It is important,
then, to consider briefly some of the arguments presented in the brief of
the Board.
First they resolved the issue into the following question:
"Does the term 'public convenience and necessity' as defined in thp Act
include the public 'need
for temporary authorization of new, but untried,
8
types of sgrvices?"
They then remarked that Congress had clearly defined the scope of their
activities in the Policy section of the Act and pointed specifically to Section
2(a) and (c). The Board went on to say that, "The 'encouragement and
development of an air transportation system' cannot be accomplished merely
by authorizing only those types of services which are of proved worth. To
do so will maintain a present system, but will not encourage and develop." 9
They felt that in order to encourage new types of services and at the same
time to protect the public interest, "a reasonable trial period, rather than
a permanent saddling of a possibly uneconomic and inefficient service on
the public and on the federal treasury,"' 10 would be the most satisfactory
solution in any cases where there was a doubt as to the outcome. And thus
they recognized that predictions, even though based on an abundance of
substantial evidence, can be wrong.
They felt that Congress must have intended that they be able to authorize
experiments and the "operation of new and untried services in an industry
as new and dynamic as air transportation,"" and cited a Supreme Court
case concerning an analogous question in connection with the Transportation
Act of 1920.12
The Board also disposed of the petitioner's contention that the granting
of a certificate by them on an experimental basis usurped an exclusive
authority vested in the Postmaster General under the Experimental Air
Mail Act. 13 Their main point was that the pertinent sections (1 and 2) had
been repealed and that an accompanying amendment had been made to
Section 405 (1) of the Civil Aeronautics Act by striking out references to
sections 1 and 2 of the Experimental Mail Act, which indicated that the
Board was now to have no restrictions against experimentation with the air
mail service. 14 The amendment (Act of July 2, 1940, "Extending the
jurisdiction of the Civil Aeronautics Authority (Board) over certain air
6 Brief of Respondent, Braniff case, pp. 28-34.
7 Braniff Airways v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 147 F. 2d 152, 153 (App.
D.C. 1945).
8 Brief of Respondent, Braniff case, p. 30.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12

Id. at footnote 6.

Is Id. at 32-34.
14

Id. at 33.
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mail services, and for other purposes,") could only extend the Board's authority in this one respect, as its only effect' was to remove the former
restriction against experimentation with air mail service which hitherto
had been referred to the Postmaster General. Nothing in the amendment
changed Section 401 (d) (2). Therefore the Board thought it followed
that they must always have had this authority to experiment under Section
401 (d) (2) subject to this one limitation which was now removed.
Thus it can be seen that there was a sound basis upon which the court
could base its decision. However, before drawing any more conclusions a
few more of the cases where the Board granted experimental certificates
should be considered.
The next indication that the Board would continue to follow this pattern
came
in 1944, in their Investigation of Local, Feeder, and Pick-up Air Service.15 They concluded that they were justified, "within reasonable bounds,"
in allowing an experimental shorthaul operation even though they had little
information of a factual nature. The applicants were fit and the public
would be greatly benefited. Furthermore, they felt that the policy declarations of the act imposed upon them the responsibility to encourage new
forms of air transportation when estimates and plans indicated that there
was a good chance for their success. However, the Board did recognize that
there was a basic conflict among the sections of the act which had to be taken
into account and reconciled in some manner, when they pointed out that they
had "an equal obligation to foster sound economic conditions in air transportation, and to promote efficient service at reasonable charges, ...." 16 As a
result they set up as a safeguard, requirements which must be met before
they would issue any temporary certificate.
"Safeguards available for use in this connection appear to be: (1)
the limitation of such authorizations to temporary periods, and (2) confinement of them to operations which show a justifiable
expectation of
17
success at a reasonable cost to the Government.'
Thus the foundation was laid for the decisions which became necessary at
the end of the war when the Board was flooded with applications for certificates of all types of newly proposed services from the numerous pilots the
war had created as well as the existing certificated air carriers.
The first of these post-war decisions came in 1946 and concerned localfeeder services in the Rocky Mountain States Area.' 8 The Board authorized
the local service on an experimental basis and again indicated that they
thought the guiding principles in Section 2 of the Act allowed them to construe Section 401 (d)(2) so as to permit experimentation. Fostering and
encouraging "the development of an air transportation system adapted to the
national needs and to encourage the development of civil aeronautics generally," 19 were thought by the Board to indicate this power in them. They
felt that experiments of this type, limited to a three year period, would permit the development of actual traffic experience which at that time didn't
exist and that this would serve as a guide at a future date to determine
whether the services was justified within the standards of the Act. If it
weren't, the Board would not grant a new certificate, or on the other hand,
20
if it were, the Board might even allow additions to be made to the service.
15 Investigation of Local, Feeder, and Pick-Up Service, 6 CAB 1 (1944).
16 Id.at 6.
17 Id. at 4.
18 Service in the Rocky Mountain States Area, 6 CAB 695 (1948).
19 Ibid.
20 Id. at 730, 731.
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As before, they recognized that there was a certain fundamental conflict
in the policies as set out in Section 2, and indicated that a middle road would
have to be followed by saying that it was incumbent upon them, "to provide
certain safeguards for the over-all economy of our air transportation system
and for the financial obligation of the Government in the form of mail compensation." 21 They then set out the same safeguards cited previously.
Next came the Freight Forwarder decision. 22 Here the Board under
Section 1 (2) of the Act 2 3 issued a regulation allowing the air freight forwarders to operate without a certificate upon the procurement of letters of
registration.
In the case of these Freight Forwarders, the Board thought it would be
extremely difficult if not impossible to fix a route pattern in the manner
contemplated under Section 401 and concluded that it would be more appropriate at that time to confer authority pursuant to Section 1 (2). Because of the indirect type of operation, they were able to avoid the requirements of finding public convenience and necessity which are omitted from
this section of the Act. Thus, since it seemed clear that the next few years
would constitute a period of experiment in air forwarding, they denied the
application for a regular certificate. They believed the experiment could
best be performed by granting this general relief order exempting forwarders from certain provision of the act under the provisions of Section
1 (2).
As a result the Board authorized the experiment, "until such time as the
Board shall find that their operations
are not in the public interest, but
'24
in no event longer than five years."
Ultimately this resulted in the only other court decision to touch upon
the subject, American Airlines et. al v. Civil Aeronautics Board.2 5 In its
opinion the court said the Board had found that the public interest in and
the need of air forwarders had been sufficiently established to justify their
operation for a limited period and from this experience a permanent policy
could be soundly determined.
It then seemed to assume that the Board had this experimental power
by saying:
".... We think it clear that it can not be said that the Board has failed to
make adequate findings in this
'2 6 case, where it is dealing largely with an
experimental undertaking.
Although this certainly cannot be considered as a specific ruling on the
point, it should be pointed out that the question of the power of the Board
to conduct experiments was discussed and the Braniff case cited in both
the Board's and the Petitioner's brief. Thus we know that the court was
informed of the question and evidently must have concluded in their own
minds that the power did exist. Surely it would seem that if they had felt
the other court had been incorrect in its decision in the Braniff case they
21

Ibid.

Air Freight Forwarder Case, CAB Docket No. 681, September 8, 1949.
. the Authority may by order relieve air carriers who are not directly
engaged in the operation of aircraft in air transportation from the provisions of
this Act to the extent and for such periods as may be in the public interest.
Section 1 (2), Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 977, 49 U.S.C. 401.
24 Air Freight Forwarder Case, CAB Docket No. 681, September 8, 1949
at p. 55.
25 178 F. 2d 903, (CAA 7, 1949).
28
Id at 908.
22

23 ".
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would have ruled on the point. For the question was raised by both parties;
and a ruling by the court against the Board's power to experiment would
have changed the outcome of the case in favor of the Petitioners.
The most recent decision involving this problem is the Air Freight Case
decided July 29, 1949.27 There the Board in a case involving the certification
of all-freight carriers, with no government subsidy through the carriage
of mail, granted temporary certificates for a period of five years on an
experimental basis. In this decision the Board said, among other things
that, "Throughout the text of the Civil Aeronautics Act runs the unmis'28
It points out, as one extakable thread of this development objective.
ample, that the Act says the mail rates are not to be fixed by the usual
means with consideration being given only to what a fair and reasonable
compensation for the services performed should be. Rather, due regard
is to be given to the financial needs of the carriers in order, "to maintain
and continue the development of air transportation to the extent and of
of the United States,
the character and quality required for the commerce
29
the Postal Service, and the national defense."
They added that in the interests of national defense a, "need for an
operating fleet of transport aircraft many times larger than that now in use
by the certificated airlines," had been substantiated by the statements of,
"high officials in military and civilian transport services," made during the
proceedings. 8 0
CONCLUSION

There seem to be several strong reasons for believing that the present
interpretation of the Act is correct and will continue to be followed.
In the first place, there is now a long line of administrative decisions
upholding the power of the Board to experiment. Secondly, the arguments
in the Board's brief in the Braniff case concerning the change in the Air
Mail Act indicate rather strongly that the Board must have had the power
all the time. Thirdly, the recent decision in the Air Freight Forwarders'
case certainly indicates that the court must have thought the Board had the
power and that the Braniff case was correct. Finally, in view of the young,
dynamic, and expanding nature of the industry with which the Act is
concerned and the Declaration of Policy in Section 2, it seems only reasonable to believe that Congress meant to give the Board the authority to allow
experiments to be made in new and untried methods of air transportation.
Such authority is subject, of course, to a showing of substantial evidence
indicating that the operation would probably be successful; and a finding
of fitness on the part of the air carrier, and of public convenience and
necessity. If these requirements are met there seems to be little reason for
contending that the Board may not issue a temporary certificate for experimental purposes, and every reason for believing that its decisions will
continue to be upheld by the courts.
ROBERT L. GRUNDER*

Student, Northwestern Law School.
27 Air Freight Case, CAB Order Serial No. E-3085 (July 29, 1949), Docket
Nos. 810 et. al. and 730.
*

28 Id at 28.
29 Ibid.

30 Id. at 33.
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EXCLUSIVE GASOLINE CONCESSIONS UNDER THE
FEDERAL AIRPORT ACT OF 1946

A

Sa result of the recent change in the Administrator's rules promulgated

under the Federal Airport Act' allowing exclusive gasoline concessions
at airports receiving federal aid, the operating expenses of the airlines
may be raised as much as fifty million dollars a year. 2 Formerly, as a
prerequisite to federal aid, airport sponsors had to agree that the airlines
could bring their own gasoline on the fields without paying entrance fees.3
Under this arrangement the airlines could gain favorable contracts with
gasoline companies. Now, however, this covenant has been removed from
sponsors' contracts, 4 and exclusive gasoline concessions may be granted by
the airfields. Since a rise in the price of gasoline of only one cent a gallon
would result in an increase in operating expenses of over $3,000,000 a year, 5
the airlines fear that the stifling of competition among the gas companies
will push the price up.
The Federal Airport Act directs the Administrator to receive assurances
"satisfactory to him" that airports receiving federal aid will be available
for "public use" on "fair and reasonable" terms without "unjust discrimination." In light of the legislative intent to encourage aviation and the
language of the section, the airlines might argue that the administrator
could not abandon a rule if it 7would result in fostering discrimination or
increasing operating expenses.
Since neither the Federal Airport Act nor the Civil Aeronautics Act s
contain review provisions applicable to the Administrator, the airlines must
turn to the Administrative Procedure Act for judicial relief. 9 Under this
act there are three preliminary requirements to meet before review is possible: (1) the plaintiff must have suffered a "legal wrong," (2) the statute
must not preclude review, and (3) the agency action must not be committed
to agency discretion. 10
1 60 STAT. 170, 49 U.S.C. §1101 et seq. (Supp. 1949).

Based on going rates, according to Robert Ramspeck, executive vice-president of the Air Transport Association. Am. Av. Daily, May 9, 1949, p. 46.
3 14 CODE FED. REGS. §550.5(c) (1949).
4 Regulations of the Administrator, §550.5(c) and §550.11(b) (3)4, 14 FED.
REG. 2405, 2409 (1949).
5Am. Av. Daily, May 9, 1949, p. 46.
6 60 STAT. 176, 49 U.S.C. 1110 (1946).
2

7When applying the Sherman Act, 26 STAT. 209, as amended, 50 STAT. 693

(1937), 15 U.S.C. §1 et seq. (1946), control by municipalities must be considered
before the action can be called an unreasonable restraint. The Act is not directed
at local governmental bodies, but at combinations to restrain competition by individuals and corporations, U.S. v. Yellow Cab Co., 69 F. Supp. 170 (N.D. Ill. 1946),
remanded 332 U.97218 (1947), 80 F. Supp. 936 (N.D. Ill. 1948), aff'd. 338 U.S.
338 (1949); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). The airlines would have to
overcome the reluctance of the federal courts to interfere with local government
to prevail. This factor is not present in suits in the state courts, although many
of the other considerations are the same.
8 52 STAT. 977 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §401 et seq. (1946).
9 City of Dallas v. Rentzel, 172 F. (2d) 122 (5th Cir. (1949)). An attempt
was made to force the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics to review an order of
the CAB granting funds to Fort Worth. The court held that §§309, 1006 of the
Civil Aeronautics Act, supra, as amended by §§459, 646(a), were not applicable
as they dealt only with decisions of the CAB. Jurisdiction was then denied under
the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 STAT. 243, 5 U.S.C. §1009(b) (1946), because it was not a court of competent jurisdiction.
1060 STAT. 243, 5 U.S.C. §1009 (a) (1946). Professor Dickerson, however,
does not accept this view. Administrative Procedure Act: Scope and Grounde of
Broadened Judicial Review, 33 A.B.A.J. 434 (1947).
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The task of determining whether the airlines have sdffered a legal
wrong when government contracts with third persons (airports) are altered
is not an easy one, because the wrong suffered by the airlines, if any, is a
relational injury. The courts have held both ways on this borderline situation," and the ambiguous
legislative history of the A.P.A. throws little
12
light on the problem.
Assuming, however, that a legal wrong has been suffered, the question
arises whether a statute precludes review where, as in the Airport Act,
there is no statutory provision for it. Before the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act absence of such a provision was often held to be fatal.'8
Although cases decided since the passage of the Act are in disagreement, 14
the legislative history seems to indicate clearly that Congress meant to allow
15
review unless a statute explicitly withheld it.
The problem still remains whether review will be denied because it is an
exercise of discretionary power. 16 The Federal Airport Act directs the
Administrator to make contracts "satisfactory to him" and thus commits
the provisions to his direction. Prior to the Administrative Procedure Act
the Supreme Court went so far as to say that a statutory term could have
several "reasonable interpretations," and that the choice by an agency of
any reasonable one would prevail. 17 The Administrative Procedure Act has
not changed this' 8 and the present temper of the court, as reflected by recent
11 The airlines could cite in their favor the controversial Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942), which said, "It is enough
that the regulations ... effect adversely appellant's contractual rights and business relations with station owners." Contra: Perkins v. Luken's Steel, 310 U.S.
113 (1940), which held: ". . . neither damage nor loss of income in consequence
of action of the government, which is not an invasion of recognized legal rights,
is in itself a source of legal rights in absence of . . . legislation recognizing
it as such."
12 The House and Senate Committees gave a broad meaning to the term,
H.R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1945) ; and Sen. Rep. No. 752, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945). Compare Sen. Rep. 43, where the Attorney General
suggested the term "legal wrong" referred to the existing law, and cited Perkins
v. Lukens Steel, 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
13 For example, the court in Switchman's Union v. National Mediation Board,
320 U.S. 297, 303 (1943), held: ". . . if congress had desired to implicate the
federal judiciary and to place on the federal courts ... any aspect of the problem, it would have made its desire plain." The court in its determination of
legislative intent noted that while the statute was silent concerning review of
their question, review was provided for other orders. This is analogous to the
fact that review is provided for the CAB and silent as to the Administrator.
14 Unger v. U.S., 79 F. Supp. 281 (E.D. Ill. 1948), and Snyder v. Buck,
75 F. .Supp. 902 (D.C. D.C. 1948) have recognized an intent to change the law
where the statute does not provide a review. Contra: Kirkland v. Atlantic Coastline Railroad Co., 167 F. 2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1948), declared that the law had been
settled as to the Railway Labor Act by the Switchman's Union Case, supra note
13, within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act which meant existing law.
15 Sen. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 229, 416 (1946) ; "A statute may
in terms prcelude judicial review, or be interpreted as manifesting a congressional
intention to preclude judicial review." Id at 311, Mr. Austin pointed out to
Mr. MeCarran cases in which no redress was given because the statute did not
provide a review and asked if the bill would remedy the defect, to which Mr.
McCarran replied in the affirmative.
16 U.S. v. Bush & Co., 310 U.S. 371, 380 (1940) ; Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co.,
310 U.S. 113, 127-130 (1940).
17 N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. Ill, 131 (1944), the case turns
upon the better ability of Administrators to solve a problem and their reasonableness in doing so.
1s The House and Senate Committees seemed to fear a substitution of judicial
for administrative discretion. Sen. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 212, 275.
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cases, favors wide discretionary powers in federal agencies. The Administrator's discretion, if not the problem of finding a legal wrong, or preclusion of review by the Acts, would probably force the airlines to seek relief
through the state courts.
It has been suggested that the state courts offer a remedy against the
cities, through the seemingly applicable old but well established law of
franchises. 20 As a general rule a municipality has no implied power to grant
exclusive privileges or franchises unless such power has been expressly conferred by the legislature. 21 It would thus seem that the express right to
grant exclusive gasoline concessions would have to be given cities by their
state legislatures before they could take advantage of the change in the
Administrator's regulations. Nevertheless, three methods by which cities
might claim they already have the right are: (1) the municipality is acting
in a proprietory capacity; (2) the privilege is so necessary to carry out an
express power as to leave its existence free from doubt; and (3) reliance
upon a broad grant of power which inadvertently may be specific enough.
Where a city acts in a proprietary capacity, it may enter into the same
exclusive contracts as a private corporation, since the rule against exclusive
franchises applies only to governmental functions. 22 Aside from the fact
that many states recognize the operation of an airport as a governmental
function, 23 the policy reasons of comfort, convenience, and safety must be
met before either a private corporation or a city acting in a proprietary
capacity may enter into a monopolistic contract. This is the theory of cases
which have upheld exclusive contracts by municipalities to transport passengers to and from railway stations. 24 These policy reasons do not favor
exclusive gas concessions, for certainly the public's convenience and comfort
would not be bettered if higher fares resulted. Neither would the safety
argument of necessity of city control over a dangerous substance be valid,
since there could be city control of movement and storage of gasoline
purchased off the field by the airlines. In fact, a strong safety argument
could be made in favor of separate sources of gasoline because of the
difficulty in tracing a bad shipment of gasoline where using a common
supply.2 5 Even if a court does find the function to be proprietary, it probably
will be difficult for a city to prevail on this theory because of the lack of a
strong policy argument.
The municipalities might argue that no express grant of power was
needed, if such power was so necessary as to leave its existence free from
19 Unemployment Comm. v. Liberty Mutual Co., 329 U.S. 143 (1946), and
Mr. Justice Rutledge's concurring opinion in Board of Governors v. Agnew, 329
U.S. 441 (1946). In Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Co., 330 U.S. 469 (1947) the
court admitted the issue was more legal than factual, but allowed the agency's
interpretation.
20 38 Opinions of the Attorney General of the State of Wisconsin 105 (March
15, 1949).
21 Freeport Water Co. v. City of Freeport, 180 U.S. 587 (1901.); 4 McQurLLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§1758, 1760 (2d ed. 1940).
22 Miami Beach Airline Service v. Crandon, 159 Fla. 504, 32 S.2d 153 (1947);
Bailey v.Philadelphia, 184 Pa. 594, 39 A. 494 (1898).
28 This is of little consequence, since the courts could still say that this
particular aspect of operating an airport is proprietary.
24 Miami Beach Airline Service v. Crandon, 159 Fla. 504, 32 S. 2d 153 (1947);
and 15 A.L.R. 356 discussing railroad station cases.
25 A discussion of the problems encountered at Washington National Airport during the war when there was but one source of supply for gas appears in
Hearings Before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 9738,
80th Cong. (1948), a bill concerning exclusive gasoline concessions (which failed).
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doubt. 26 Where the safety of the public is involved, it has been held that

municipalities may grant exclusive franchises under general powers delegated to provide for the health and safety of their inhabitants. 27 But since
the safety argument runs into trouble, the cities might fare better by asserting that no express grant of power by the legislature is needed to give them
power to confer exclusive gasoline concessions. Such power is so necessary
as to leave its existence free from doubt on the ground that the revenue
is necessary for the airport to break even. However, the airlines might
reply that recent surveys have shown that larger airports where the airlines buy most of their gas are
breaking even without revenue increases
28
from exclusive gas concessions.
The difficulty encountered in most state statutes in trying to find a provision that might be construed as an express grant of power for exclusive
gas concessions is that the state aeronautic and airport acts were based
upon or made to conform with the federal acts and the Administrator's
rules. Nevertheless, cities in Illinois are given a general grant of power
to "grant concessions" for the servicing of airplanes, 29 and servicing could
easily be interpreted now to mean the supplying of gasoline. While in New0
York airports may "sell" gas, no right is expressly given to sell exclusively.
The wording of statutes of other states gives many of them, Pennsylvania
for example, 31 sufficient express power to have exclusive concessions.
The airlines will thus be unable to get relief in many state courts merely
because by pure chance their statutes were drawn so broadly as to allow an
interpretation which permits airports to have exclusive gasoline concessions.
The policy reasons regarding aviation gas taxes, are the same as for these
concessions, and some 29 states completely exempt or refund taxes on aviation fuel.3 2 Many of these same states are now inadvertently saddling the
airlines with an expense the same as that which they expressly wished
to avoid.
In seeking judicial relief from the Administrator's sanction, the airlines
are beset with procedural obstacles in the federal judiciary. In some of the
state courts the airlines will be able to block exclusive concessions under
franchise laws, but many state statutes are susceptible of an interpretation
allowing concessions. If state legislatures fail to remedy this inconsistency
with the policy of their aviation gas tax statutes,8 3 perhaps competition with
airports where airlines may furnish their own gas will tend to keep the
price down. The fact that some airlines are now operating in the black,
however, should not be the signal to throw open the barriers to possible
abuses of this infant industry.

PETER NEVITT*

* Student, Northwestern University School of Law.
26 Parkhurst v. Capital City Ry. Co., 23 Or. 471, 32 P. 304 (1893); 4
MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §1758 (2d ed. 1940).
27 Consumers Co. v. Chicago, 313 Ill. 408, 145 N.E. 114 (1924) ; 3 McQUILLAN,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §962 et seq. (2d ed. 1940).
28 16 Municipal Yearbook 317-323 (1948); and Am. Av. Daily, Jan. 20,
1950, p. 97.
29 ILL. REv. STAT. c. 24 §22-7(3) (1949).
80 A power to grant ,concessions is given, but modified in very general terms in
N. Y. PUBLIC AUTHORITIES LAW §1447(13) (1949) (New York City Airport Authority Act) ; also the power to "purchase and sell gas" and to "charge for . . .
services, concessions .. .," is given, N. Y. GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW §352(3) (4)
(1949.a.a Stat. tit. 2, §1503 (d) (1948). Also see Mass. G.L. c. 90, §§51i, 50f
(1948)
32 Resolution adopted by the North American Gas Tax Conference on Sept.
15, 1948. Seven states taxed gasoline at the regular rate and thirteen at some

fraction of that rate. Arditto, State and Local Taxation of Scheduled Local Air-

lines, 16 J. Air L. 162 (1949), discussed the problem.
a3 California has, Cal. G. L. c. 151a, §7(1) (1949).

